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Abstract
We use data from the military enlistment for a large representative sample of Swedish
men to assess the importance of cognitive and noncognitive ability for labor market out-
comes. The measure of noncognitive ability is based on a personal interview conducted by
a psychologist. Unlike survey-based measures of noncognitive ability, this measure is a sub-
stantially stronger predictor of labor market outcomes than cognitive ability. In particular,
we ￿nd strong evidence that men who fare badly in the labor market ￿in the sense of long-
term unemployment or low annual earnings ￿lack noncognitive but not cognitive ability.
We point to a technological explanation for this result. Noncognitive ability is an important
determinant of productivity irrespective of occupation or ability level, though it seems to be
of particular importance for workers in a managerial position. In contrast, cognitive ability
is valuable only for men in quali￿ed occupations. As a result, noncognitive ability is more
important for men at the verge of being priced out of the labor market.
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For the vast majority of people, labor market earnings is the main source of income. It is
therefore of vital importance for individuals and policy makers to understand which abilities
or skills determine success in the labor market. In one view, cognitive ability is the single
most important determinant of labor market outcomes (e.g. Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).
An alternative view holds that noncognitive abilites such as persistence, motivation, emotional
stability, or social skills are equally or more important (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Jencks,
1979; Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001a; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006).
The existing evidence is not clearly in favor of either view. Though a large literature con￿rms
that IQ and other measures of cognitive ability are robust predictors of labor market outcomes,
they can only explain a small fraction of the variance in earnings.1 On the other hand, the
estimated e⁄ect of noncognitive ability on outcomes varies substantially in the literature and is
often small compared to the e⁄ect of cognitive ability.2 However, inference about the importance
of noncognitive ability is di¢ cult due to a lack of valid measures. Most studies in psychology
and economics use measures of noncognitive abilities and related personality traits based on
self-reported questionnaires. Compared to IQ tests, such measures are less reliable and less
precise (Borghans et al., 2008b). In addition, the valuation of cognitive and noncognitive ability
is likely to di⁄er across sectors and occupations.
In this paper, we investigate the e⁄ect of cognitive and noncognitive ability on labor market
outcomes using a measure of noncognitive ability based on a personal interview conducted by a
professional psychologist. Using this measure, we ￿nd that noncognitive ability is considerably
more important than cognitive ability for success in the labor market. Moreover, our results
suggest that the e⁄ect of cognitive ability on wages, unemployment and earnings has been
overestimated in previous studies due to a lack of adequate controls for noncognitive ability.
We obtain our measures of cognitive and noncognitive ability by using unique data from
the Swedish military enlistment. The enlistment is mandatory for all young Swedish men and
spans two days with tests of health status, physical ￿tness and cognitive ability. In addition, each
conscript is interviewed by a certi￿ed psychologist with the aim to assesses the conscript￿ s ability
to ful￿ll the psychological requirements of serving in the Swedish defense, ultimately in armed
combat. The set of personal characteristics that give a high score include persistence, social
skills and emotional stability. Both the cognitive test score and the psychologists￿assessment
1See, for example, the studies by Bishop (1991); Murnane et al. (1995); Cawley et al. (1996); Neal and
Johnson (1996); Altonji and Pierret (2001); Cawley et al. (2001) and Blau and Kahn (2005). Bowles, Gintis and
Osborne (2001a) provide a summary and discussion of this literature.
2See Borghans et al. (2008 b) and Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) for reviews and discussion about the
previous literature on personality, noncognitive skill and economic outcomes.
1are set on a discrete nine-point scale which approximates a normal distribution.
We argue that the psychologists￿assessment o⁄er a more precise measure of noncognitive
ability than measures based on self-reported questionnaires. First, it is arguably easier to lie
in a questionnaire than straight to another person. Second, many personal traits which may
be di¢ cult to accurately capture in a questionnaire are revealed in a personal encounter. The
enlistment psychologists have thus access both to more extensive and more accurate information
about conscripts￿psychological status than what can be deducted from surveys. Our principal
￿ndings support this notion.
First, our measure of noncognitive ability is a substantially stronger predictor of wages than
the survey-based measures previously employed in the literature. In a regression with a standard
set of control variables, a one standard deviation increase in this measure predicts an increase
in wages by about nine percent or one third of a standard deviation, compared to ￿ve percent
for cognitive ability.3 Not controlling for noncognitive ability gives an upward bias of more than
forty percent on the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability on log wages.
Second, noncognitive ability is a much stronger predictor of employment status than cog-
nitive ability. A one standard deviation increase in noncognitive ability predicts a decrease in
the probability of receiving unemployment support by 3.3 percentage units, compared to 1.1
percentage units for cognitive skill. Moreover, men with high noncognitive ability have shorter
unemployment spells while cognitive ability has no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the duration
of unemployment.
Finally, noncognitive ability is a stronger determinant of annual labor market earnings, in
particular at the low end of the earnings distribution. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in noncognitive ability predicts a decrease in the probability that annual earnings fall
short of the tenth percentile of the earnings distribution by 4.7 percentage units. The corre-
sponding ￿gure for cognitive ability falls from 1.5 to 0.2 percentage units when noncognitive
ability is controlled for.
Figure 1 and 2 provide graphical illustrations of the e⁄ect of cognitive and noncognitive
ability on annual earnings. Figure 1 shows how the proportion of low income earners varies
with noncognitive ability among men with average cognitive ability and, correspondingly, how
the proportion of low income earners varies with cognitive ability among men with average
noncognitive ability. As is clear from the ￿gure, a very large proportion of men in the two lowest
noncognitive ability categories have low earnings, despite average cognitive ability. Figure 2
shows the estimated partial e⁄ects of cognitive and noncognitive ability on the probability of
earning less than the tenth percentile in a regression with a standard set of control variables.
3The set of control variables include region of residence, cohort, family background, enlistment into the military
service, education and linear-quadratic terms in experience.
2Apart from the higher proportion of low income earners among men with the lowest cognitive
skill score (1), the proportion of men with low annual earnings does not change appreciably as
cognitive ability increases. In contrast, an increase in noncognitive ability is associated with a
lower proportion of low income earners throughout the skill distribution.4
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The particularly strong e⁄ect of noncognitive ability on unemployment and annual earnings
is consistent with the institutional features of the Swedish labor market and the valuation of
abilities across di⁄erent types of workers. Though there is no minimum wage law in Sweden,
workers with low productivity are priced out of the labor market due to union wage bargaining
(Skedinger, 2008). Consequently, small changes in productivity can have a large e⁄ect on annual
earnings if they make the di⁄erence between employment and unemployment. In our case, a
closer look at the data reveals that while log wages are linear in noncognitive ability, they are
strictly convex in cognitive ability with a low marginal product for low ability levels. This implies
that noncognitive ability is particularly important for workers who have low productivity and
who, consequently, are at risk of becoming unemployed.
The di⁄erential e⁄ects of cognitive and noncognitive ability on log wages suggest that abilities
are rewarded di⁄erently across occupations. Dividing workers into three occupational groups
(managers, quali￿ed workers and unquali￿ed workers), we ￿nd a clear selection pattern with
respect to our ability measures. Though workers in unquali￿ed occupations have a lower general
level of ability, the di⁄erence is more pronounced for cognitive ability. Interestingly, workers
in a managerial position have somewhat lower cognitive ability than workers in other quali￿ed
4The results in Figure 1 and 2 have not been adjusted for measurement error in our skill measures. Since the
measure of noncognitive skill has a lower reliability ratio than the cognitive skill measure, the pattern displayed
in Figure 1 and 2 is therefore an underestimation of the relative importance of noncognitive skill.
3occupations, but signi￿cantly higher noncognitive ability. This selection pattern is consistent
with occupation-speci￿c skill prices. For unquali￿ed workers and managers, noncognitive ability
has a signi￿cantly higher return than cognitive ability. In contrast, quali￿ed workers in non-
managerial positions have similar return to cognitive and noncognitive ability. In essence, we
￿nd that noncognitive ability is important regardless of occupation or level of ability, while
cognitive ability is important only for workers in quali￿ed occupations.
We believe these results are relevant for policy. In particular, by demonstrating the impor-
tance of noncognitive ability for unquali￿ed workers, our paper strengthens the argument for
social interventions like the Perry Preschool program or Head Start, which o⁄er an enriched en-
vironment to children from a disadvantaged background. Previous research has found that these
programs are successful in improving noncognitive abilities but has no e⁄ect on IQ (Heckman,
2000; Cuhna et al., 2006).
Our paper is related to the small but expanding literature on personality and socioeconomic
outcomes initiated by Bowles and Gintis (1976), Edwards (1976) and Jencks (1979).5 The ma-
jority of these papers use measures of personality based on self-reported questionnaires. For
example, measures of self-esteem (Goldsmith, Veum and Darity, 1997), withdrawal and aggres-
sion (Osborne, 2003) and Machiavellianism (Turner and Martinez, 1977) have been found to
predict wages. There is also an extensive literature on the predictive power of various person-
ality measures from the psychology literature, such as the ￿ve factor model (see Borghans et
al. 2008b for a survey and Mueller and Plug 2005 for a recent contribution in the economics
literature).
Another strand of the literature infer noncognitive ability from observable choices. Heckman
and Rubinstein (2001) consider the Generational Educational Development (GED) program
which allows high school dropouts to obtain a high school diploma. GED test takers earn
lower wages than predicted by their cognitive ability, which Heckman and Rubinstein attribute
to low noncognitive ability. Relatedly, Heckman et al., (2006) infer cognitive and noncognitive
ability by estimating a latent factor model estimated on NLSY data while Kuhn and Weinberger
(2005) use participation in sports in high-school or a leadership position in clubs as indicators
of leadership ability.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ￿rst in this literature to consider a measure of
noncognitive ability based on a personal interview.6 Moreover, by considering a wide set of labor
market outcomes and more ￿ exible functional forms, we show that noncognitive ability is much
more important than cognitive ability for avoiding unemployment and poverty. This is a point
5See Borghans et al. (2008 b) and Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) for surveys of this literature.
6Gr￿nqvist and Vlachos (2008) use the measures of cognitive and noncognitive ability from the Swedish en-
listment in a study of teacher performance.
4not fully appreciated in the previous literature which have focused on estimating linear models
of cognitive and noncognitive ability on log wages. We are, to the best of our knowledge, also the
￿rst to include measures of both cognitive and noncognitive ability in a model of occupational
choice.
In line with the previous literature, we use "noncognitive ability" as a term for abilities which
are distinct from the ability to solve abstract problems and traditional measures of human capital
such as training and experience. We acknowledge that this terminology is not perfect as most
(or all) of the character traits considered as "noncognitive" involve some form of cognition.7
The words "ability" and "skill" are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Our data and measures of cognitive and noncognitive ability
are discussed in Section 2. We discuss our basic estimation strategies in Section 3. The results
for wages, employment and earnings are reported in Section 4. We consider occupational choice
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Data
The data used in this paper is obtained by matching a data set on socioeconomic outcomes
for a representative sample of the Swedish population (LINDA) with data from the military
enlistment. We focus on labor market outcomes in 2006. The military service is mandatory only
for men, and we exclude the small fraction of women for whom we have enlistment data.
The ￿rst cohort for which we have enlistment data is men born in 1965 (enlisted in 1983
and 1984). In comparison to the anglo-saxon countries, many Swedes with higher education
enter the labor market late in life. For this reason, we do not consider men born after 1974,
implying that the youngest men in our data were 32 years old in 2006. We also exclude men born
outside of Sweden; men with an incomplete record from the military enlistment or enlistment
after 1993; men with a business income above 10 000 SEK; men who are not visible in any public
records (zero earnings and no taxable transfers); men who received student support and men
who worked in the agricultural sector. With these restrictions, our sample consists of 14,703
men distributed evenly over the 1965-1974 birth cohorts.8
7See, for example, Borghans et al. (2008). Another form of criticism is o⁄ered by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne
(2001b) who argue that character traits like persistance or dependability should not be viewed as skills, but are
more accurately viewed as preferences which employers value in the face of incomplete labor contracts.
8Our largest cohort are men born in 1965 (1,626 observations) and our smallest cohort men born in 1974 (1,304
observations).
52.1 Socioeconomic variables in LINDA
The main data sources for LINDA are the Income Registers and the Population Census.9 LINDA
is thus complete with respect to di⁄erent sources of taxable income and social bene￿ts like
unemployment support. In addition, LINDA contains information on occupation and wages
from separate registers held by Statistics Sweden. The wage registers are not complete for the
private sector. In total, we have data on wages in 2006 for 12,570 workers, or 85.5 % of the
sample. The remaining group consists both of people with no or limited participation in the
labor market (e.g., people who were unemployement or on long-term sick-leave) and men whose
employers did not report wages.
We use the wage data from ￿ve previous waves of LINDA (2001-2005) to impute wages for
men for whom we do not observe the wage in 2006. We use the wage from the year closest to
2006 when wage data is available from several years and adjust for in￿ ation.10 Using wages from
previous years, we are able to add 1,401 observations to the data, bringing the total number to
14,038, or 95.5 % of our sample. This imputation technique rests on the assumption that men
whose wages were not observed in 2006 experienced no change in productivity between 2006
and the year of the latest wage observation. In Appendix B, we report the results when we
only consider wages reported in 2006 and when we use data on annual earnings to impute wages
for men with no data on wages for the entire 2001-2006 period. We also discuss an estimation
technique (median regression) where assumptions on imputed wages can be relaxed.
We consider three di⁄erent forms of social bene￿ts related to lack of employment: unem-
ployment support; early retirement bene￿ts and social welfare bene￿ts.11 Individuals must be
actively looking for a job in order to qualify for unemployment support whereas early retirement
bene￿ts requires that an individual is incapable of working full-time due to poor health. Both
unemployment support and early retirement bene￿ts are based on previous income. In contrast,
eligibility for social welfare hinges on the individual￿ s current economic circumstances. The
reason why we do not only consider unemployment support is that individuals may substitute
between di⁄erent types of social bene￿ts. In particular, people substitute from unemployment
support to early retirement since unemployment support has a time limit and a lower reimburse-
ment ceiling. For each type of bene￿t, we construct dummy variables that take the value one
if a person received positive transfers in 2006.12 We also construct measures for the fraction of
the year 2006 spent in unemployment using data on total unemployment bene￿ts and income
9Edin and Fredriksson (2000) provide a detailed account of the data collection process for LINDA.
10The wage data for 2006 is censored at 12,000 SEK. We use the same cuto⁄ for the imputed wages.
11The Swedish terms are arbetsmarknadsst￿d, sjuk- och aktivitetsers￿ttning and socialbidrag.
12LINDA does not contain information on employment status at a particular point in time.
6in previous years.13
We construct ￿ve dummy variables for educational attaiment from the information in LINDA:
only primary school (9 years), secondary school (11-12 years), two years education beyond
secondary school, university degree, and a Ph.D. Further, we construct a measure of potential
labor market experience de￿ned as the number of years between graduation and 2006, implying
that two men with the same educational attainment and age can still have di⁄erent levels of
experience. We also construct three dummy variables for the three main regions in Sweden and
dummy variables for the metropolitan areas of Sweden￿ s three major cities.14
Direct information on family background are not available in LINDA, but we are able to con-
struct variables on family status, parental income and occupational choice by using information
in the 1980 wave of LINDA. The details are available in Appendix A.
2.2 The enlistment data15
The military enlistment usually takes place the year a Swedish man turns 18 or 19.16 The
enlistment procedure spans two days involving tests of medical status, physical ￿tness, cognitive
ability, and an interview with a psychologist. For the period we consider, almost all men who
did not get a low health rating were enlisted to the military service.17 Importantly, it was not
possible to avoid the military service by obtaining a low score on cognitive or noncognitive skill.18
However, the results on cognitive and noncognitive skill predict the precise type of service to
which conscripts are enlisted.
13The details behind the construction of our measures are available in Appendix A.
14The regions are G￿taland, Svealand and Norrland. The cities are Stockholm, G￿teborg and Malm￿.
15The discussion of the Swedish enlistment is based upon reports and literature from the Swedish armed forces
(F￿rsvarsmakten) and an interview with Johan Lothigius, chief psychologist at the SNSA (Pliktverket), August
25, 2004. In addition, both authors of this paper have undergone the military enlistment and between them spent
more than two years in the Swedish Army.
16In our sample, 0.03 % did the military enlistment tests the year they turned 17, 73.68 % the year they turned
18, 24.61 % the year they turned 19, 1.30 % the year they turned 20 and 0.38 % the year they turned 21 or more.
17A linear regression of a dummy for "enlisted to the military service" on a set of health classi￿cation dummies
has an R
2 of :73. Among the men in the highest health category (A) 96.5 % were enlisted compared to none of
the men in the second lowest and lowest health categories (Y and Z). In total, 90.0 % of the men in our sample
were enlisted to the military service. Due to the end of the cold war, the size of the Swedish army has shrunk
considerably and only a small fraction of Swedish men serve in the military today.
18Once health status is controlled for, the result on the test of cognitive ability is not a statistically signi￿cant
predictor of enlistment. The score on noncognitive ability is statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level, but
the estimated e⁄ect is weak; an increase in estimated noncognitive skills by one standard deviation predicts an
increase in the probability of being enlisted by 0:53 percentage units.
72.2.1 Measure of cognitive ability
The Swedish military has conducted tests of conscripts￿cognitive skills since the mid 1940￿ s.
These tests have changed several times over the years, but the men in our sample all did the
same test.19 This test consists of four di⁄erent parts (synonyms; inductions; metal folding and
technical comprehension) which are each graded on a scale from 0 to 40. The results of these
tests are then transformed to a discrete variable of general cognitive ability ranging from 1 to
9.20 This variable follows a Stantine scale that approximates a normal distribution.21
We create two measures of cognitive ability based on the enlistment tests. First, we normalize
the 1-9 measure of general cognitive ability to a distribution with zero mean and unit variance.22
This measure is available for the entire sample and used in our main speci￿cations. However,
in regressions with higher order terms and adjustment for measurement error, the discreteness
implied by the underlying nine-point scale turns out to be problematic as the higher moments
do not ￿t a normal distribution with unit variance (see Section 3.2). We therefore construct an
alternative measure of cognitive ability from the sum of the raw scores on each subtest, which
ranges from 0 to 160. The sum of the subscores is percentile rank-transformed and then converted
by taking the inverse of the standard normal distribution to produce normally distributed test
scores. This measure has a more continuous distribution and higher moments closer to a normal
distribution with unit variance. The main reason to focus on the ￿rst rather than the second
measure is that data on the subscores underlying the general score is only available for 13,064
out of 14,703 observations in our data. Our results in the linear case are similar regardless of
which measure we use.
2.2.2 Measure of noncognitive ability
Like the tests of cognitive skills, personality tests were introduced at the military enlistment in
the early 1940￿ s by Torsten HusØn, a proli￿c writer in the ￿eld of military psychology.23 This
19See Carlstedt (2000) for a detailed account of the history of psychometric testing in the Swedish military. She
provides evidence that the test of intelligence is a good measure of general intelligence (Spearman 1904).
20The conversion is done in two steps. First, each 0-40 score in converted to a 1-9 score. The sum of these four
scores (ranging from 4 to 36) is then converted to the ￿nal 1-9 score.
21The ideal Stantine distribution (with % of population in parentheses) is: 1 (4 ); 2 (7); 3 (12); 4 (17); 5 (20);
6 (17); 7 (12); 8 (7); 9 (4).
22We use the same normalization for all cohorts even though the exact mapping from the scores on each subtest
to general cognitive ability has changed slightly over the years. The reason is that we lack data on enlistment year
for 141 observation. The correlation between a normalization for all cohorts and a normalization by enlistment
year is :999 for cognitive ability and :998 for noncognitive ability.
23HusØn recognized already at an early stage that selection into the military service must be based both on an
assessment of constripts￿skills, such as intelligence, and of his character (HusØn 1942 b). For example, HusØn
emphasized the important role for emotional stability (1942 a) for success in the military. Another common
theme in HusØns early writings is that men will bring their personality in civilian life into the military service.
8development was inspired by the extensive testing procedure that Germany had built up during
the 1930￿ s for the selection of o¢ cers and specialists, and by experiences from the United States
(HusØn 1941). The early attempts at designing adequate tests for di⁄erent personality types
were characterized by relatively advanced psychometric methods and a strong focus on evaluating
their predictive power for performance in the military.24 Important later sources of inspirations
were the The American Soldier Studies, the ￿rst large-scale study about soldiers￿attitudes and
experiences of war, and the experiences of Swedish troops on UN-missions (Lothigius, 2004).25
All the men in our data had their psychological pro￿les evaluated according to a procedure
that was adopted in 1972 and kept unchanged up to 1995 when it was subject to minor revisions.
This procedure implies that conscripts are interviewed by a certi￿ed psychologist for about 25
minutes.26 As a basis for the interview, the psychologist has information about the conscript￿ s
results on the test of cognitive ability, physical endurance, muscular strength, grades from school
and the answers to 70-80 questions about friends, family and hobbies, etc. The interview is semi-
structured in the sense that the psychologist has to follow a manual that states certain topics
to be discussed, though speci￿c questions are not decided beforehand.27
The objective of the interview is to assess the conscript￿ s ability to cope with the psychological
requirements of the military service and, in the extreme case, war.28 The psychologists assign
each conscript￿ s ability in this respect a score from 1 to 9, which follows the same Stantine
distribution as the ￿nal test score for cognitive ability.29 This score is in turn also based on
four di⁄erent subscores which range from 1 to 5. The subscores function only as a guide to the
For example, HusØn (1946) emphasizes that men who have di¢ culties adjusting to their civilian environment will
only see these di¢ culties magnify while in the military: Men who have not matured before entering the military
are unlikely to do so while in the military.
24In 1942, a wide range of tests was conducted on an entire cohort of conscripts (32,000 men) with the aim of
acquiring expertise on how to conduct psychological tests (HusØn 1942 c). The tests of cognitive ability, physical
￿tness, but also of willpower and power of initiative. The reliability of each test was then evaluated by correlating
the test scores with the commanding o¢ cer￿ s assessment of the conscripts￿military skills at various stages of the
military service. Based on these experiences, a test of cognitive ability was introduced in 1944 together with
more extensive tests of personality for applicants to the military academies (HusØn 1946). By 1950, psychological
stability and ability to adjust to the military environment were assessed for the majority of conscripts in a 10-20
minute interview (HusØn 1951).
25The American Soldier Studies consisted of interviews with more than half a million soldiers on a diverse set of
subjects, e.g. their attitudes toward the enemy, their mental health and their combat experiences (see Lazers￿eld,
1949).
26Psychologists have to undergo a four-week course prior to working for the SNSA. The educational require-
ments have increased over time. As of the mid-1970￿ s, most psychologists had a bachelor￿ s degree (Lilieblad and
St￿hlberg, 1977)
27The term for this type of interview in the psychology literature is anamnestic.
28Carlstedt (1999) shows that this score has predicted power for the commanding o¢ cers￿assessment of con-
scripts￿skills after completion of the military service.
29In addition, leadership skills are estimated for those who score at the average or above on the test of cognitive
abilities. In practice, the assessment of ability to cope with war stress and leadership skills are based on rather
similar criteria and highly correlated in the data (.88).
9psychologists ￿two conscripts with the same sequence of subscores could still get di⁄erent ￿nal
scores.30
We create two measures of noncognitive ability based on the psychologists assessment of the
potential conscripts. First, we normalize the 1-9 score to a distribution with mean zero and unit
variance. Second, in order to get a more continuous variable, we take the sum the result on
each subscore and convert it into an approximately normally distributed variable using the same
procedure as for cognitive ability. As for cognitive ability, the subscores are not available for
the entire sample and we therefore use the second measure only in regressions with higher order
terms. The two measures are highly correlated (:97) and the results do not change appreciably
in the linear case depending on which measure we use.
What character traits and abilities give a high score at the enlistment interview? According
to the SNSA, a high ability to function in the military requires willingness to assume responsi-
bility; independence; outgoing character; persistance; emotional stability, and power of initiative
(Lothigius, 2004). Another important aspect is the conscript￿ s ability to adjust to the speci￿c
requirements of life in the armed forces, like the loss of personal freedom.31 Motivation for
doing the military service is not among the set of characteristics that are considered bene￿cial
for functioning in the military (Lothigius, 2004). SNSA psychologists Andersson and Carlstedt
(2003, p. 8) argue that there is no evidence that highly motivated individuals are also better
suited for military service. In their view, selection based on the motivation for the military
service would have a negative e⁄ect on the quality of conscripts.
Also worth to note is the importance attached to social skills. Citing previous research in
psychology, Andersson and Carlstedt (2003, p. 9) argues that group cohesion is the single most
important factor that in￿ uence soldiers￿ability to cope with war stress. Soldiers overcome their
anxiety and continue to ￿ght not because of strong feelings of hostility toward the enemy but
because they don￿ t want to abandon their friends. Accordingly, the single most important cause
of soldiers￿mental breakdowns during combat is a breakdown of group cohesion. As a result,
people who "do not posess the ability to function in a group and help create group cohesion
are [...] un￿t for combat." The importance of group cohesion is also stressed by The American
Soldier Studies. Among the key ￿ndings from these studies were the low prevalence among
30The de￿nition of the subscores underlying the psychologists assessment is not publicly available information.
However, as outlined below, we have extensive information on the basis for the psychologists￿assessment from
other sources.
31HusØn (1946) describes the di¢ culties in adjusting to military life: In the military, individuals lose part of
their individuality, as their ability to express some parts of their personality is limited. Moreover, the collective
nature of military life implies that concripts lose a substantial part of their privacy. Finally, the need to become
part of the strict military hierarcy implies that conscripts see their freedom of choice curtailed. HusØn argues
that men with exhibitionistic personality or a strong need to assert oneself will experience the loss of self as more
painful.
10combat troops of strong expressions of hostility toward enemy soldiers; the near universality of
fear, and the importance of group obligations rather than ideological considerations in motivating
soldiers for battle (Lazarsfeld, 1949).
Another explicit objective with the interview is to identify people who are particularly un-
suited for the military service. For instance, people with undemocratic values or an obsessive
interest in the military are not considered ￿t for military service (Lothigius, 2004). The same
holds true for men with some kind of antisocial personality disorder, in particular psychopaths
(Andersson and Carlstedt, 2003, p. 9).32 Other aspects of personality that are considered neg-
ative are di¢ culty in accepting authority, to adjust to a di⁄erent environment and violent or
aggressive behavior (Andersson and Carlstedt, 2003, p. 13).33
Our measure is di⁄erent from the types of measures previously used in the literature on
personality and labor market outcomes. Instead of measuring a speci￿c trait, our measure
capures a speci￿c ability, i.e., the ability to function in the very demanding environment of
armed combat. We argue that this ability is also likely to be rewarded in the labor market.
Just like in the military, success in most work environments requires the ability to socialize with
co-workers, to cope with stress, to show up on time and to be able to deal with criticism and
failure.
Apart from the measure of noncognitive skills, there are two additional advantages with our
data. First, the fact that the enlistment procedure always takes place around the age of 18 or 19,
as opposed to for example the cognitive testing within the National Longitudinal Study of Youth,
mitigates the problem of reverse causality with schooling and labor market outcomes. Second,
the size of the data set (more than 14,700 individuals) allows us to obtain precise estimates and
explore labor market outcomes in detail.
32The di¢ culty in assessing people with antisocial personality disorders is one reason for why the SNSA relies on
interviews rather than questionnaires. In particular, psychopaths with high intelligence could trick a questionnaire
test and give answers that they know will increase their chances of obtaining military command (Andersson and
Carlstedt, 2003, p. 11).
33The focus on avoiding the martial mis￿ts, like neurotics and psychopaths, is present already in HusØn writings
from the 1940￿ s. HusØn (1946) argues forcefully that the military service itself is unlikely to change men to the
better. Men with an anti-social personality will, if anything, become more anti-social. Neurotic men will see their
symptoms worsened, etc. In a large study of conscripts￿with particular discipline problems, HusØn (1951) argues
that a substantial share of indiscipline conscripts exhibit problems adjusting to also to civilian life.
113 Estimation
In this Section, we discuss our strategy for estimating how cognitive and noncognitive skills
a⁄ect wages, unemployment and labor market earnings. Consider the equation
yi = f (ci;ni) + Xi￿ + "i; (1)
where yi is one of the three labor market outcomes, ni is the normalized measure of noncognitive
ability, ci the normalized measure of cognitive ability and Xi a vector of control variables. We
consider di⁄erent speci￿cations of f (ci;ni), but ￿like the previous literature ￿we focus on the
linear case. That is, we consider the case when
f (ci;ni) = ￿cci + ￿nni.
As an extension, we add quadratic terms for ci and ni and an interaction term between ci and
ni to f (ci;ni).
There are three important issues to consider in the estimation of (1). First, we do not observe
wage o⁄ers for the entire sample, which might give rise selection bias. This potential problem
is not present in the case of unemployment and annual earnings which are observed for the
entire sample. Second, the interpretation of the estimated parameters depends on the variables
included in Xi. Third, our estimates may be biased if c or n are measured with error.
We use two approaches for controlling for selection bias in our wage regressions. First, we
test whether our results change when we exclude or include imputed wages. Second, we use
three alternative estimation methods that control for selection bias under di⁄erent conditions
(median regression, Heckman two-step and Identi￿cation at in￿nity). To facilitate the reading,
we discuss these approaches and the results in Appendix B. In essense, we ￿nd that our main
results are unlikely to be driven by selection bias. In this Section, we instead focus on which
covariates to include in Xi and measurement error.
3.1 Covariates
Since choices taken after the age of 18 are a⁄ected by skill endowment, such factors should not
be included in a regression that aims to estimate the total e⁄ect of skills on wages. In contrast,
a regression that aims to estimate skill prices should control for factors that are rewarded in the
labor market and correlated with skills. We run regression (1) with two di⁄erent speci￿cations of
Xi. In the ￿rst speci￿cation, Xi contains dummy variables for region of residence, cohort, family
background, enlistment into the military service and whether or not an individual has education
12above primary school.34 In the second speci￿cation, we add to Xi the full set of indicator variables
for educational attainment, and linear-quadratic terms in experience. The ￿rst regression thus
gives the total e⁄ect of skills on outcomes, while the second regression estimates the e⁄ect which
is independent of schooling and experience. In wage regression, estimation with the large set of
control variables gives the price of cognitive and noncognitive skills in the labor market.
A di¢ cult tradeo⁄ is whether or not to control for type of military service. Though the
military service is mandatory, conscripts have some freedom to a⁄ect the position they are
assigned to provided that they ful￿ll the speci￿c requirements for this position. On the one
hand, both cognitive and noncognitive test scores have a direct e⁄ect on the type of military
training to which conscripts are enlisted. In particular, conscripts who are considered to have
high ability are more likely to be enlisted as squad or platoon leaders. To the extent that the
type of military service a⁄ects future wages, not including type of military service as a covariate
in Xi will imply undercontrolling. On the other hand, the fact that a worker with a high score
on noncognitive or cognitive skill was not enlisted into a leadership position is a signal of an
unwillingness to assume responsibility. Hence, controlling for type of position will imply that
the identifying variation in skills is in fact correlated with an aspect of personality that can be
presumed to have a negative e⁄ect on outcomes. For this reason, we have chosen only to include
a dummy for enlistment into the military service in the basic speci￿cations. The main results
when type of military service is controlled for are reported in Table 12.
Another potential concern in that the measure of noncognitive skills functions as a proxy
for health status, which might have an independent e⁄ect on outcomes. There is, indeed, a
positive correlation between noncognitive skill and health status classi￿cation at the enlistment
in our data. In comparison, the correlation between cognitive skill and health status is much
weaker.35 The estimated e⁄ect of noncognitive skill on wages is somewhat lower when health
status is controlled for, but this result is almost entirely driven by sample selection as health
status classi￿cation is only available for about 50 % of our sample (results not reported).
Another issue is the role of schooling for the formation and measurement of cognitive and
noncognitive skill. In our case, the far majority of conscripts undergo the enlistment procedure
the year they turn 18 or 19. Since nine years of primary school is mandatory in Sweden, this
implies that enlisted men may di⁄er by a maximum of three years of schooling.36 Not controlling
for education up to the age of 19 may thus bias our estimates of (￿c;￿n). On the other hand,
including a variable for educational attainment at the age of 19 may imply overcontrolling as
34We lack data on educational attainment for 47 observations.
35A regression of noncognitive ability on the full set of dummy variables for health status classi￿cations has an
R
2 of :2361 compared to :0496 for cognitive ability.
36A small proportion of Swedish men undergo the enlistment procedure at a more advanced age than 19, and
may thus have obtained a higher level of schooling at the time of the enlistment (see Section 2).
13causality runs in both directions. As reverse causality is likely to imply an upward bias, we
include a dummy variable for no educational attainment beyond primary school also in the
small set of covariates.
3.2 Measurement error
There are several reasons to expect both our measures of cognitive and noncognitive skill to be
measured with error. For example, motivation for the military service is likely to a⁄ect perfor-
mance on the test of cognitive skill and in the enlistment interview. The score of noncognitive
ability is also subject to a particular form of measurement error since psychologists vary in their
assessment of identical conscripts. Lilieblad and St￿hlberg (1977) estimated the correlation be-
tween the SNSA psychologists￿assessment of noncognitive skills to be :85 after letting thirty
SNSA psychologists listen to tape recordings of thirty enlistment interviews.37
Assuming classical measurement error, our measure of cognitive skills, c; is a function both
of actual skills (denoted by c￿), and of a random error term, vc. That is,
c = c￿ + vc





and Cov (c￿;vc) = 0.38 We make the same assumptions regarding mea-
surement error in noncognitive ability. Similar to Heckman et al. (2006), we thus view the
measured level of cognitive and noncognitive ability as re￿ ecting both true ability and measure-
ment error.39 However, note that the "true" ability in this context refers to the cognitive and
noncognitive abilities valued by the Swedish military. These abilities may not perfectly coincide
with the abilities sought after by employers in the civilian labor market.
In a bivariate regression, classical measurement error leads to a downward bias of the esti-
mated strength of the relationship between two variables. This is not necessarily the case in a
multivariate context. Since our skill measures are positively correlated (:389), classical measure-
ment error in one skill measure will imply an upward bias of the estimated e⁄ect of the other
skill measure.40
37Since all psychologist listen to the same interviews, this correlation is not an exact measure of the true
correlation between psychologists￿assessment. The fact that psychologists make their own interviews could, in
theory, both imply that the true correlation is higher or lower than :85.
38We further assume that all cross-moments between the true variables and the measurement errors are zero
(see Appendix C).
39Heckman et al. (2006) use a model with latent factor structure to adjust for measurement error. Our approach
is di⁄erent, as outlined below.
40The positive correlation between cognitive and noncognitive ability may re￿ ect an e⁄ect of noncognitive ability
on cognitive test scores (see Borghans et al. 2008 c).
143.2.1 Twin data
We use data from a sample of twins to calculate the reliability ratio of each skill measure. Here,
we illustrate this method in the case of cognitive skills but the argument is the same in the case
of noncognitive skill. Consider the equation
￿yMZ = ￿MZ￿c￿
MZ + "; (2)
where ￿yMZ is the di⁄erence in some outcome (in our case annual earnings) within monozygotic
(identical) twin pairs, and ￿c￿
MZ the corresponding di⁄erence in true cognitive skill. By regress-
ing ￿yMZ on ￿cMZ (the observed within twin-pair di⁄erence in cognitive skill), we obtain an
estimate of ￿MZ which we denote e ￿MZ.41 Following Griliches (1979), we show in Appendix C










(1 ￿ ￿MZ) + ￿MZ (3)
where ￿MZ is the correlation in c within monozygotic twin pairs. The ratio e ￿MZ=￿MZ denotes
the share of the within-twin variance in measured cognitive skill that re￿ ect true di⁄erences in
skill.
We get an analogous expression for dizygotic (fraternal) twins. That is, the estimates from
the regression
￿yDZ = ￿DZ￿c￿
DZ + "0; (4)














are directly observable in the data, the reliability ratio is identi￿ed
under the assumption that ￿MZ = ￿DZ.
An implicit assumption in the formulation above is that there is no correlation in measure-
ment error within twin pairs. This assumption could be violated if, for example, motivation
a⁄ects performance and motivation for the military service is correlated within twin pairs. If
this correlation is weakly above zero, the estimated reliability ratios are in fact upper bounds
41Note that the parameter ￿MZ does not have a causal interpretation as di⁄erences between twins in cognitive
ability are likely to be correlated with other factors that enhance earnings.
15on the true reliability ratios.




have been provided to us by David
Cesarini based on a sample from the Swedish Twin Registry restricted to the cohorts which
are relevant in our case.42 This sample covers 701 twin pairs with data on annual earnings
and the enlistment skill measures.43 As shown in Appendix C, the reliability ratios implied by
these estimates are :8675 for cognitive and :70267 for noncognitive ability.44 Note that the lower
reliability ratio for noncognitive ability is consistent with the lack of perfect congruence between
the assessment of di⁄erent psychologists. Using the estimated reliability ratios and assuming
zero covariance between measurement errors, it is straightforward to adjust for measurement
error.45 46
3.2.2 Measurement error in nonlinear models
As shown by e.g. Griliches and Ringstad (1970), estimation problems due to measurement error
gets worse in models with higher order terms. In quadratic models, the e⁄ect of measurement
errors is to ￿ atten the curvature of the estimated function.47 Hence, estimating more ￿ exible
functional forms of f (ci;ni) puts higher demand on the data and on the speci￿cation of mea-
surement error. In our case, the discreteness of the ability measures implies that the higher
moments of the observed variables di⁄er from what would be the case for normally (and thus
continuously) distributed variables with unit variance. In particular, the fourth moments of
cognitive and noncognitive ability are lower than three.48 In order to obtain more continuously
distributed ability measures with higher moments that better ￿t the assumed distribution, we
use the alternative ability measures based on subscores in estimations with quadratic or in-
teraction terms. These alternative ability measures ￿t better with our implied distributional
42The parameters are estimated by OLS regressions with annual earnings as the dependent variable. The results
are very similar when we instead consider the log of annual earnings as the dependent variable.
43The twins in the Swedish Twin Registry data (both monozygotic and dizygotic) are somewhat positively
selected in terms if cognitive and noncognitive ability compared to our sample (about .25 standard deviations for
each measure). About 3 % of the twins from the Swedish Twin Registry can be presumed to be present in our
data.
44We take the estimated reliability ratios to be true in our labor market outcome regressions. This may imply
a downward bias on the estimated standard errors as the uncertainty regarding the true reliability ratios is not
taken into account. However, all coe¢ cients of interest in the linear case increase as a result of adjusting for
measurement error and are strongly statistically even with no adjustment for measurement error.
45We adjust for measurement error using Stata￿ s [eivreg] command. For a textbook treatment of this method,
see Kmenta (1997) or Draper and Smith (1998).
46We have performed robustness tests with a positive covariance in the measurement error in cognitive and
noncognitive ability. This is the case that would apply if, for example, motivation for the military service a⁄ects
performance on both tests positively. Assuming positive measurement error covariance increases the estimated
e⁄ect of both cognitive and noncognitive ability (results not reported).
47See Kuha and Temple (2003) for a discussion of measurement error in quadratic models.
48The fourth moment of a normally distributed variable with mean zero and unit variance is 3￿
4 = 3.
16assumptions. We impose a few additional assumptions on the cross-moments in order to obtain
a measurement error variance-covariance matrix where all o⁄-diagonal terms are equal to zero.
The details are available in Appendix C.
4 Labor market outcomes
In this section, we discuss the e⁄ect of cognitive and noncognitive skills on wages, unemployment
and annual labor market earnings. We ￿rst consider wages.
4.1 Wages
Table 2a gives the results for regression (1) using di⁄erent estimators with log wages as the
dependent variable. The results for the other two wage measures are discussed in Appendix B
along with the other tests for selection bias. The ￿rst column of Table 2a reports the results for
the OLS estimator with the small set of covariates and no adjustment for measurement error.
In this case, an increase in cognitive skill by one standard deviations increases log wages by
:086. The estimated wage premium to noncognitive skill is :067 log points. The relative size
of cognitive and noncognitive skills is reversed once we include the full set of control variables
for educational attainment and experience in the second column. Whereas the estimated e⁄ect
of cognitive skill on wages is very sensitive to controlling for experience and education, the
estimated e⁄ect of noncognitive skill is only a⁄ected to a small extent. The reason for this result
is that cognitive skill is a much stronger predictor of educational attainment than noncognitive
skill.49 Hence, a considerable part of the total e⁄ect of cognitive skill at age 18 on wages in
adult age re￿ ects education, and not a direct price for skills.
Adjusting for measurement error in column 3 and 4 increases the estimated e⁄ect of noncog-
nitive skill by more than 50 percent while the results for cognitive skill increase only slightly. As
a result, the total e⁄ects of cognitive and noncognitive skills on log wages are similar at :089 and
:102. The e⁄ect of noncognitive skill is 68 percent larger than the e⁄ect of cognitive skill when
we control for education and experience: a one standard deviation increase in noncognitive skill
increases log wages by :091 compared to :054 for cognitive skill. Table 2a also shows that the
estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability on log wages is sensitive to whether noncognitive ability is
controlled for or not. Dropping noncognitive ability from the regression (column 8) increases
the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability on log wages by 46 percent.
49A linear probability model of the likelihood of obtaining a university degree on our ability measures and the
small set of control variables shows that a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability predicts an increases
in the probability of obtaining a university education by 16.3 percentage units compared to 4.5 percentage units
for noncognitive skills.
17Our estimates of noncognitive skill on wages are larger than what has been previously found
in the literature. For example, Heckman et al. (2006) report :121 as the standardized OLS
estimate for cognitive skill on log wages and :042 as the standardized OLS estimate for their
measure of noncognitive skill.50 In the speci￿cation most similar to our speci￿cation with the
large set of control variables, Mueller and Plug (2006) ￿nd moderate standardized e⁄ects for the
Big Five-factors agreeableness (￿:036) neuroticism (￿:022) and openness to experience (:033).
Similarly, Borghans et al. (2008) review the evidence from the psychology literature and ￿nd the
Big Five-factors to be weakly correlation with job performance. Borghans et al. (2006) report
that a one standard deviation increase in sociability in childhood (age six) increase wages by
about one percent on average, though this e⁄ect is larger in occupations where social skills are
particularly important.
The di⁄erence between our estimates and the previous literature becomes even starker when
we normalize our coe¢ cients with respect to the variance in the dependent variable (i.e., log
wages). This result is a consequence of the relatively compressed wage structure in Sweden.
Adjusting for measurement error, a one standard deviation increase in noncognitive skill increases
log wages by :317 standard deviations with the small set of covariates and :283 with the large set.
These estimates can be compared to the studies surveyed by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001)
where the normalized e⁄ects of externality (Rotter scale), self-esteem and other personality
measures are found to be to be between one fourth and half of our estimates. Our point estimates
are in the same order of magnitude as the combined e⁄ect of seven psychological variables in
Jencks (1979) of :245 (see Table 1 in Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001).
As shown in column 7-12 of Table 2a, our measure of noncognitive skill is a strong predictor
of outcomes also in terms of variance explained. In isolation, noncognitive skill explains 18:0
percent of the variation in log wages, compared to 20:0 percent for cognitive skill. Including both
noncognitive and cognitive skill implies that 25:6 % of the variance in log wages is explained.
In comparison, Mueller and Plug (2006) ￿nd that all factors in the ￿ve factor model combined
explain ￿ve percent of the variation in log wages while Heckman (2006) ￿nd that their cognitive
skill measure explains 9:0 percent of the variance of log wages compared to 0:9 percent for their
noncognitive measure. Moreover, given that the large set of control variables are included as
regressors, our noncognitive skill measure is a stronger predictor of log wages in terms of increase
in variance explained than cognitive skill (see column 8-10 in Table 2a).
The analysis has so far centered on the log-linear model outlined in Section 3. Though
a linear model has the advantage of giving results that are easy to interpret and compare to
previous literature, it may not provide the full story. We therefore include quadratic terms and
50Heckman et al. (2006) compute their measure of noncognitive skill as a (standardized) average of the Rosen-
berg Self-Esteem Scale and Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale.
18an interaction e⁄ect between cognitive and noncognitive ability, using the alternative ability
measures described in Section 2.2 and 3.2. The ￿rst two columns of Table 2b shows that the
results for the linear case are very similar when we use the alternative measures of cognitive and
noncognitive ability.
Table 2b shows that log wages are strictly convex in cognitive ability. This pattern remains
stable regardless of whether or not we adjust for measurement error or include the interaction
e⁄ect.51 In contrast, log wages are linear in noncognitive ability in the speci￿cations without
adjustment for measurement error and strictly concave when we adjust for measurement er-
ror. Given the lower reliability ratio of noncognitive ability and the problems associated with
measurement errors in quadratic terms, we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions from the
implied nonlinearity in noncognitive ability. However, the results strongly suggest that the re-
turn to noncognitive ability is not increasing with ability level. Our results also indicate that
their might be a positive interaction e⁄ect between cognitive and noncognitive ability, but this
result is sensitive to including the large set of covariates and quadratic terms.
The strong convexity for cognitive ability implies that the marginal product of cognitive
ability is close to zero for men at the low end of the cognitive ability distribution. In contrast, the
marginal product of noncognitive skill is high also for men at the low end of the noncognitive skill
distribution. This is important since, for men with low skills, small changes in productivity can
make the di⁄erence between employment and unemployment. Though there is no minimum wage
law in Sweden, the e⁄ective minimum wage is relatively high due to the strong in￿ uence of trade
unions and the extensive welfare system, implying that men with su¢ ciently low productivity
are priced out of the labor market.52 Consequently, we should expect the level of noncognitive
skill to be a stronger predictor of labor market participation than cognitive skill.
4.2 Unemployment
As shown in Table 3, noncognitive skills is a much stronger predictor of receiving unemployment
support some time during 2006 than cognitive skill. This is true regardless of whether educational
attainment and experience are controlled for or not. For example, in a regression with the large
set of control variables and adjustment for measurement error, a one standard deviation increase
in noncognitive skills predicts a reduction in the probability of receiving unemployment support
by 3:3 percentage units compared to 1:1 percentage units for cognitive skills. Table 3 also reveals
that the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability on employment status is very sensitive to controlling
for noncognitive ability. Dropping noncognitive ability from the regressions implies and increase
51The strict convexity for cognitive ability holds also in a non-parametric test where we enter a separate dummy
variable for each value on the sum of subtests (see Appendix D).
52See Skedinger (2008) provide an overview of the Swedish mininum wage system.
19in the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability on unemployment of about 100 percent. Table 4
gives the results for the probability of receiving any form of social assistance related to a weak
position in the labor market. In this case, the estimated e⁄ect of noncognitive skill is even larger
compared to cognitive skill.53
Including quadratic terms for skill endowment in column ￿ve and six of Table 3 reveals that
the relationship between noncognitive skills and unemployment is strictly convex. This result
is consistent with the estimates from the wage equation: Since noncognitive skill has a linear
relationship with log wages, the relationship between noncognitive skills and unemployment
weakens as the skill level increases and fewer workers are close to selecting out of the labor
market.
We also ￿nd that noncognitive skills predicts the duration of unemployment spells: As shown
in Table 5, unemployed men with high noncognitive skills have a signi￿cantly higher hazard rate
for obtaining a job, while the e⁄ect of cognitive skills is both economically and statistically
insigni￿cant. This result is robust to using di⁄erent types of duration models and OLS. The
size of the e⁄ect is substantial. When estimated with OLS, a one standard deviation increase in
noncognitive skill decreases expected unemployment duration by :91 months.
4.3 Earnings
Since noncognitive skills is a strong predictor of both wages and labor force participation, it can
be expected to have a strong impact on annual labor market earnings. As shown in Table 6a,
this is indeed the case. In the regression with the large set of covariates and adjustment for
measurement error, a one standard deviation increase in noncognitive skills predicts an increase
in yearly earnings by 52,500 SEK (about 6,400 US dollars) or about one sixth of a standard
deviation. The corresponding estimate for cognitive skills is 16,800 SEK (2,100 US dollars) or
about six percent of a standard deviation. Similar to wages and employment status, we ￿nd
that the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability is sensitive to controlling for noncognitive ability.
As shown in Table 6b, we obtain similar results if we instead use the log of annual earnings
truncated from below at 120,000 SEK as the dependent variable.
Another way to look at the data is to investigate how skill endowment a⁄ect the probability
of belonging to certain groups of the income distribution. Table 7 shows that noncognitive skills
have a much stronger e⁄ect than cognitive skills on the probability of belonging to the group
of low income earners. Controlling for the large set of covariates, a one standard deviation
in noncognitive skills decreases the probability of belonging to the 10 percent lowest income
earners by 4:7 percentage units, compared to 0:2 percentage units for cognitive skills. The
53Another potential explanation for why is noncognitive ability is such a strong predictor of unemployment is
that it predicts workers￿reservation wage. We do not test this explanation here.
20relative importance of cognitive skill increases as we consider the probability of belonging to the
group of middle- or high-income earners, but it is never close to the e⁄ect of noncognitive skill.
A related way to study how skill endowment a⁄ect the distribution of income is to see how
di⁄erent quantiles of the earnings distribution vary with skill endowment. Table 8 gives the
results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile (these regressions are not adjusted for
measurement error). In line with our previous results, we see that noncognitive skill is more
important than cognitive skill for outcomes at the lower end of the earnings distribution but
that the e⁄ect of cognitive skills increases the higher the percentile of the income distribution
we consider.
4.4 Summary of results
The analysis above has shown that noncognitive skill, as measured at the Swedish enlistment,
is more important for labor market success than cognitive skill. Our results also point to two
striking di⁄erences between the e⁄ect of cognitive and noncognitive skills on wages. First, unlike
cognitive skills, noncognitive skills are not strongly related to educational attainment. Second,
while log wages are concave or linear in noncognitive skills, they are strictly convex in cognitive
skills. The marginal product of cognitive skill is thus low and the low end of the distribution
of cognitive skill, but at high at the high end. Consistent with this ￿nding, we also ￿nd that
noncognitive skills is a much stronger predictor of selection into employment and of poverty. In
the next section, we test whether di⁄erences in skill prices across occupations can explain the
observed selection patterns and nonlinearities in productivity.
5 Di⁄erences across occupations
Due to di⁄erences in production technology, cognitive and noncognitive skills may be priced
di⁄erently across sectors. In particular, we expect cognitive skills to be more important in
highskilled occupations. For example, it seems reasonable that cognitive skills is more important
for the productivity of a chemical engineer than a supermarket cashier. It is, in our view, less
obvious a priori which relationship to expect for noncognitive skills.
Data on occupational status in 2006 is available in LINDA for 12;379 workers. For all
occupational groups except managers and military o¢ cers, our data contains information on the
level of quali￿cations needed on the job. We classify workers in the two highest quali￿cation levels
(out of four) as "quali￿ed" and the workers in the two lowest quali￿cation levels as "unquali￿ed".
Managers are treated as a separate group. We exclude the small group of military o¢ cers as it
21is unclear whether they should be classi￿ed as managers or quali￿ed workers.54
Table 9 shows the average level of cognitive and noncognitive abilities across these three
occupational categories. Two ￿ndings stand out. First, the average level of cognitive skills is
highest among workers in quali￿ed occupations, whereas managers have the highest average
level of noncognitive skills. Second, the di⁄erence between quali￿ed and unquali￿ed workers
is stronger in terms of cognitive than noncognitive skills. The di⁄erence between quali￿ed
and unquali￿ed workers is :95 standard deviations in cognitive skills compared to :59 standard
deviations in noncognitive skills.55
More formally, Table 10 gives the marginal e⁄ects from a multinomial logit of occupational
choice on (ci;ni;Xi). In the speci￿cation with the small set of control variables, high cognitive
skills is a strong predictor of selection into a quali￿ed occupation, while men with low cognitive
skills are more likely to select into a lowskilled occupation. This pattern remains the same
when education and experience are controlled for, though it is less pronounced. Men with high
noncognitive skills are more likely to become managers or work in quali￿ed occupations than
workers with low noncognitive skills. The predictive power of noncognitive skills on occupational
choice is insensitive to controlling for educational attainment.
We now turn to an estimation of the returns to skills across occupational groups. The key
econometric problem in this estimation is that we only observe the wage in a given occupation
for men who have selected into this occupation. For example, we do not observe the wage that
managers would earn as quali￿ed workers, and vice versa. If unobserved factors that in￿ uence
occupational choice are also correlated with productivity in di⁄erent occupations, then self-
selection may bias our estimated skill prices.
More formally, we want to estimate the model
logwij = ￿c;jci + ￿n;jni + Xi￿j + "ij
where j = fmanager, quali￿ed, unquali￿edg. The econometric problem is that wij is only ob-
served in case person i chooses occupation j. Let
w￿
ij = zi￿j + ￿ij
denote the utility individual i attaches to working in occupation j. Each individual chooses
the occupation that maximizes his utility. For example, we only observe wages in lowskilled
occupations in case
54Further details underlying our classi￿cations are available in the Appendix.
55All di⁄erences in average skills between occupational groups are statistically signi￿cant at the one percent
level, expect for the di⁄erence between managers and highskilled workers in cognitive skills which is statistically









McFadden (1973) showed that the model above leads to the multinomial logit model in case
the error terms in the choice equations are independent and identically Gumbel distributed.
Lee (1983) proposed a procedure to correct for selection bias in the multinomial case which is
essentally an application of the Heckman (1979) selection model. Bourguignon et al. (2007)
argues that the Lee (1983) procedure imposes strong assumption on the covariances between
the error terms in the selection and the outcome equations. Instead, they propose an alternative
estimator based on Dubin-McFadden (1984) but which allows for more general distributions for
"ij, in particular the normal distribution. We consider both of these estimators.56
We use as instruments in the selection equation region of residence in 1980 and dummy
variables for whether mother and father worked in a white-collar occupation in 1980. Our
identifying assumptions are thus that, controlling for parental income and (ci;ni;Xi), parents￿
occupational status and region of residence in 1980 will a⁄ect occupational choices only through
preferences for di⁄erent types of jobs. For example, children whose parents worked in a white-
collar job could have a higher utility in white-collar jobs, but are not more productive once we
include our full set of covariates and measures of cognitive and noncognitive skills. Since we do
not observe occupational choice for all the men in the data, we include a fourth category of "no
data on occupation" in the selection equation.
The estimated occupation-speci￿c skill prices are displayed in Table 11. In general, the esti-
mated skill prices are consistent with the more pronounced convexity in the return to cognitive
skills and the selection patterns documented in Section 4. Noncognitive skill has a higher re-
turn than cognitive skill for managers and workers in unquali￿ed occupations while workers in
quali￿ed occupations have a return to cognitive skill similar to the return to noncognitive skill.
There is a small previous literature on occupational choice and skill endowment. In line with
our results, Schmidt and Hunter (2004) ￿nd that the importance of IQ rises with job complexity
while Gould (2005) ￿nd relatively small di⁄erences across sectors. Consistent with our ￿nding
that noncognitive skills is not a strong predictor of skill level, Barrick and Mount (1991) ￿nd
that the Big Five-factor conscientiousness does not vary much with job complexity.
There is also some previous evidence in support of the view that personality is of particular
importance for workers in managerial positions. Surveying the psychology literature, Borghans
et al. (2008 b) ￿nd that while IQ is considerably more important for job performance than
any of the Big Five-factors, the Big Five-factor conscientiousness is slightly stronger correlated
56All estimations based on multinomial logit are conducted with the Stata selmlog command developed by
Bourguignon et al. (2007).
23with leadership than IQ. Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) ￿nd that men who occupied leadership
positions in high school are more likely to occupy a managerial position as adults and that
the wage premium associated with high school leadership is higher in managerial occupations.
Borghans et al. (2008 a) document that a prefence for "directness" over "caring" is associated
with work in managerial positions.
6 Concluding remarks
A key problem in the literature on personality and labor market outcomes is to obtain valid
measures of noncognitive abilities. In this paper, we have used a measure of noncognitive ability
based on a personal interview. In contrast to survey-based measures of noncognitive ability, this
measure is a substantially stronger predictor of labor market success than cognitive ability. In
particular, we ￿nd strong evidence that men who fare badly in the labor market in the sense
of long-term unemployment or low annual earnings lack noncognitive but not cognitive ability.
We point to a technological explanation for this result: Noncognitive ability is an important
determinants of productivity irrespective of occupation or skill level, though it seems to be of
particular importance for workers in a managerial position. In contrast, the return to cognitive
ability is low for unquali￿ed workers but high for workers in quali￿ed occupations. As a result,
noncognitive ability is more important for men at the verge of being priced out of the labor
market.
Our results suggest that the emphasis put on cognitive ability by, for example, Herrnstein
and Murray (1994) should be subject to serious quali￿cations. Since cognitive and noncognitive
ability are positively correlated, a failure to control for noncognitive ability will lead to an upward
bias on the e⁄ect of cognitive ability on outcomes. In our case, cognitive ability does not predict
poverty once noncognitive ability is controlled for, while the estimated e⁄ect of cognitive ability
on wages, unemployment and annual earnings is reduced substantially.
Previous research (e.g. Cunha et al. (2006), Cunha and Heckman (2007)) have suggested
that noncognitive abilities can be substantially a⁄ected by early interventions. By demonstrating
the particular importance of noncognitive ability for workers with low skills, our results thus
reinforce the message put forth by these authors that early interventions for disadvantaged
children could have large bene￿ts.
The results in this paper are potentially important for a number related literatures. For ex-
ample, the literature on skill-biased technological change and has so far focused on the increased
importance of cognitive ability (e.g., Murnane et al 1995). Moreover, the genetic and cultural
transmission of noncognitive ability could be important for understanding the intergenerational
transmission of inequality (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2002 and Bj￿rklund et al. 2006).
247 Appendix A: Data
7.1 Construction of durations
We observe all the major transfers associated with absence from work. Those transfers are
unemployment bene￿ts, sick leave bene￿ts and bene￿ts during parental leave. It is however
common that college educated workers have extra unemployment insurance for a limited period
of time, which we do not observe. In following we abstract from those, assuming that they
last for only a short period. The unemployment bene￿ts from the government and the parental
leave bene￿ts are a function of earnings in the previous year while sick leave bene￿ts are a
function of the current wage rate (which we recalculate to the corresponding annual income).
The replacement rates and ceilings that determine the size of the transfer are reported in the
following table.
Benefit Policies (2006)
Replacement rate Ceiling (SEK)
Unemployment 80% 240;900
Sick leave 80% 347;000
Parental leave 69% 347;000
Note: The ceiling for sick leave and parental leave bene￿ts was 297,000
until July 1 and SEK 397,000 after July 1. We use the average.
The replacement rate for parental leave is variable decided by the
parents. We set it to 6/7 of 80 %.
Based on the observed transfers in a given year and earnings in the previous year, the
duration of an unemployment spell and the duration of leaves due to illness or parenthood is
computed. In the case of sick leave the current wage rate is approximated by last year￿ s income.
Let variables denoted with stars (￿;￿￿) refer to last year￿ s earnings truncated at each of the two




0:8 ￿ earnings￿ +
sick leave bene￿ts
0:8 ￿ earnings￿￿ +
parental leave bene￿ts
0:69 ￿ earnings￿￿
For x percent of the observations the computed duration is greater than one and in these cases
it is set equal to one.
25It is more di¢ cult to infer durations for individuals with the previous year￿ s earnings equal to
zero, and we therefore treat these as missing observations when we use the imputed durations to
impute wages or unemployment spells. As a robustness check in the analysis of unemployment
spells, we also consider earnings prior to 2005 when we impute employment durations.
7.2 Imputation of wages
Based on the duration measure and reported earnings it is possible to impute wages for individ-
uals with no observed wage rate in 2001-2006 as long as their earnings is observed. Note that
the fraction of time worked in 2006 is given by (1￿ duration). Assuming that the individual
works full-time the wage rate is:
w =
earnings
12 ￿ (1 ￿ duration)
￿ 0:9385
where the last factor represents the average relation between the twelve times the wage rate and
annual earnings in the sample.
7.3 De￿nition of parents in the wave of 1980
The oldest female in a household is de￿ned as mother if she is at least 20 years old and if some
other criteria are satis￿ed. Similarly, the oldest male may be de￿ned is father if he is at least 20
years old and the remaining criteria are met. The remaing criteria concern civil status. If both
a woman and a man satis￿es the age criteria and both of them are married they are de￿ned as
mother and father, respectively. If only one of the two is reported as married or if one of the
two is reported to be divorced then this person is de￿ned as a parent and the other person is not
de￿ned as a parent. The household￿ s income is de￿ned as both parents￿income if two parents
are present, otherwise the household￿ s income is de￿ned as the mother￿ s or the father￿ s income.
7.4 De￿nition of parental occupation in 1980
There are no direct information on occupation available in the 1980 wave of LINDA. We therefore
use industry code (SNI69) of occupation as a proxy for occupation. This code is very detailed
(￿ve-digits), but we use the ￿rst two digits which indicate industry in a broader sense. We classify
parents working in postal services and telecommunications; banking and ￿nance; insurance;
administration and consulting; public administration; education and culture as "white collar"
and parents working in forestry; ￿shing; mining; ready-made clothing; pulp; chemical industries;
other types manufacturing; energy; construction; retail; tourism; transportation; water and
sanitation and repair services as "blue-collar".
267.5 Occupational choice
We use the information on occupation LINDA contains information on occupation (SSYK96) to
assign workers into three broad occupation groups: managers, highskilled workers and lowskilled
workers. We use the ten broadest occupational categories in the data, numbered from 0-9. We
de￿ne men in group 0 (military work) and group 1 (managerial work) as "managers". Group 2-9
has a quali￿cation level attached to them (group 0 and group 1 are not assigned a quali￿cation
level), and we use this to classify workers as "highskilled" or "lowskilled". The quali￿cation
level goes from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest). We de￿ne workers in group 2 (quali￿cation level 4) and
group 3 (quali￿cation level 3) as "highskilled", while workers in group 4-8 (quali￿cation level 2)
and 9 (quali￿cation level 1) are de￿ned as "lowskilled".
7.6 Regional dummies
All municipalities in Stockholm county except for Norrt￿lje, Nykvarn, Nyn￿shamn and S￿dert￿lje
are coded as belonging to greater Stockholm. Greater Gothenburg include the municipalities
G￿teborg, Kung￿lv, Stenungsund, Tj￿rn, ￿cker￿, M￿lndal, Partille, H￿rryda, Lerum, Ale and
Kungsbacka. Greater Malm￿ inlcude the municipalities Malm￿, Lund, Trelleborg, Vellinge,
K￿vlinge, Sta⁄anstorp, Lomma, Svedala, and Burl￿v.
8 Appendix B: Tests for selection bias
As already discussed in Section 2, we do not observe wages for the entire sample. One reason we
do not observe wages is that employers do not report them to Statistics Sweden. If such workers
are not systematically di⁄erent from workers with observable wages in terms of the relationship
between skills and wages, this will not bias our estimates. A more serious problem is that we do
not observe wages for men who do not work. Though there is no minimum wage law in Sweden,
the e⁄ective minimum wage is relatively high due to the strong in￿ uence of trade unions and the
extensive welfare system. This implies that men with low productivity or a strong preference for
leisure will be selected out of the labor market. Following Gronau (1974), suppose men select




i = ￿c2ci + ￿n2ni + Xi￿2 + "i2.




nni + Xi￿0 + ui > 0 (6)
27where ￿0
c ￿ ￿c ￿ ￿c2, ￿0
n ￿ ￿n ￿ ￿n2, ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 and ui ￿ "i ￿ "i2. Let I = 1 denote the case
when wi ￿ wr
i and I = 0 the case when wi < wr
i. A selection bias occurs in case ui is correlated
with "i. We use four di⁄erent methods to deal with this potential problem.
Our ￿rst approach is to test if our results are sensitive to whether imputed wages are included
or not. The results reported in the text considered the case when wages in 2006 were imputed
from observed wages in the 2001-2005 period. Here, we consider the case when we exclude all
imputed wages and when an imputed wage is added also for some of the men whose wage is
unobservable in the entire 2001-2006 period. Using records on social bene￿ts (unemployment
bene￿ts, pensions, sick leave and parental leave), we construct a measure on the number of
months in employment in 2006.57 We then divide total labor income in 2006 with this number
to get an imputed monthly wage.58 We code this wage as missing in case it falls short of 12,000
SEK. Using wages imputed this way increases the number of observations by 175, bringing the
total number to 14,213, or 96.7 % of our sample. The table below summarizes the di⁄erent wage
measures used in the paper.
Measure Method N
W1 Wages observed in 2006 12,570
W2 W1 + imputed from observed wages in 2001-2005 if W1 is missing 14,038
W3 W2 + imputed from annual earnings and social bene￿ts in 2005-2006 if W2 missing 14,213
Our second approach is median regression. The advantage of median regression over OLS
is that the results are only a⁄ected by the position of the imputed wage with respect to the
conditional median.59 Hence, the results from median regression are not sensitive to the exact
value of imputed wages. If log wages are linear in c and n, median regression identi￿es the
same parameter as OLS. To assign men with missing wages an imputed wage on the right side
of the conditional median, we calculate the predicted values from a median regression of the
logarithm of annual earnings on (ci;ni;Xi). Let wi denote the wage from either of our three
wage measures described in Section 2 and Ki denote an indicator variable equal to one in case
actual earnings exceeds predicted earnings and equal to zero in case actual earnings falls short
of predicted earnings. For each wage measue, we then create a new variable yi = wi if Ii = 1,
57The details behind our construction of these measures are available in the Appendix.
58We multiply the imputed wage by a factor :9385 since the yearly labor market income implied by reported
monthly wages only constitute 93:85 % of actual income as reported in tax records. The likely reason for this
discrepancy is that some men work more than full-time.
59Bloom￿eld and Steiger (1983) provide the mathematical details for this result. Other papers that have
used median regression to control for selection bias are Neal and Johnson (1996), Neal (2004) and Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2008).
28yi = 0 if Ii = 0 and Ki = 0 and yi = 108 if Ii = 0 and Ki = 1.60 In other words, we assign
men with missing wages and an annual earnings below the conditional median a wage below the
conditional median, and men with missing wages but an annual earnings above the conditional
median a wage above the conditional median.
Our third approach is to employ the two-step procedure proposed by Heckman (1976, 1979).
As we do not have a valid instrument for selection into the labor market, we rely on the non-
linearity of the inverse Mill ratio to identify (￿c;￿n;￿). Leung and Yu (1996) argue that the
Heckman two-step estimator is e⁄ective even in the absence of an exclusion restriction in the
selection equation, provided that at least one of the variables in the vector of covariates has
enough variation to induce tail behavior in the inverse Mills ratio. As we will see, noncognitive
ability is a strong predictor of participation in the labor market, suggesting that the Heck-
man two-step procedure could actually work for our purposes. Still, we view the results from
Heckman two-step as a robustness check, not as our favoured speci￿cation.
We use as our fourth approach a simple variant of "identi￿cation at in￿nity" (Chamberlain,
1986; Heckman, 1990). The idea behind this identi￿cation strategy is to restrict the sample
to a group of workers for whom the choice to select into the labor market is not a⁄ected by
unobservable productivity ("i). To this end, we ￿rst run a probit regression of an indicator
variable of observable wages on (ci;ni;Xi) and then run regression (1) for men whose covariates
imply a high predicted probability of nonmissing wages. A drawback with this method is that
inferences may not be valid for the entire sample.
Table B1 reports the results from di⁄erent approaches to control for selection bias. These
results are not adjusted for measurement error and should thus be compared to the standard OLS
estimates of column one and two in Table 2. We ￿rst show that the results are very similar for the
two other wage measures described in Section 2. We then consider the di⁄erent methodological
approaches outlined above. First, the results from median regressions is displayed in column
￿ve and six.61 As described above, the advantage of median regression over OLS is that it is
less sensitive to the imputed values of missing wages. Second, we employ a simple variant of
"identi￿cation at in￿nity" by ￿rst running a probit regression of the probability of observed
wages and then restricting the sample to men whose covariate values predicts this probability to
be above 85 percent. Both quantile regression and "identi￿cation at in￿nity" give results close
to the OLS estimates. Finally, column nine and ten give the results from a Heckman two-step
estimator. Even though these estimates are not corrected for measurement error, we ￿nd that
the estimated e⁄ect of noncognitive ability is larger than for cognitive ability already in the
60The only reason we choose such a high value as 10
8 is to be certain that these wages are indeed above the
conditional median.
61The results for median regression, Identi￿cation-at-in￿nity and Heckman two-step for the two sample with
directly observable wages and the second measure of imputed wages are reported in Table A2.
29speci￿cation with the small set of covariates. However, as we do not have a credible exclusion
restriction in the selection equation, these estimates should be interpreted with caution. In sum,
the results in Table B1 do not indicate that our results are driven by selection bias.
9 Appendix C: Measurement error
9.1 Validation from twin data
We describe our adjustment for measurement error in the context of cognitive skills, but the
application to noncognitive skills is identical. Consider a simple model where the true level of
cognitive skill (c￿) is unobservable but where there is a measure of c such that
c = c￿ + v





and Cov (c￿;v) = 0. Assuming that the correlation in v within twin pairs














2 is the within-twin pair covariance in c￿. Without loss of generality, we can normalize








Now consider the within-twin di⁄erence in observed cognitive skill
￿c = ￿c￿ + ￿v.
= c￿
1 ￿ c￿
2 + v1 ￿ v2




























Now, running a regression of within MZ twin di⁄erences in some outcome (like annual earn-



































Rearranging this expression gives
￿2














Note that the LHS of this expression is equivalent to the reliability ratio of c. Assuming that
the true e⁄ects ￿MZ = ￿DZ are the same for DZ twins, we get
e ￿MZ
￿MZ
(1 ￿ ￿MZ) + ￿MZ =
e ￿DZ
￿DZ
(1 ￿ ￿DZ) + ￿DZ
￿DZ = ￿MZ =
e ￿DZ (1 ￿ ￿DZ) ￿ e ￿MZ (1 ￿ ￿MZ)
￿MZ ￿ ￿DZ
.
31Once we have obtained ￿MZ (or, equivalently, ￿MZ), we can also get the reliability ratio. From
an OLS on annual earnings, we get for the noncognitive measure
￿ =
36569(1 ￿ 0:5217) ￿ 2338(1 ￿ 0:6953)
0:6953 ￿ 0:5217
= 96651
This gives us an reliability ratio for noncognitive skills which is
e ￿MZ
￿
(1 ￿ ￿MZ) + ￿MZ =
2338
96651
(1 ￿ 0:6953) + 0:6953 = 0:70267
Using the same formula and corresponding data for cognitive skills, we get
￿ =
14829(1 ￿ 0:5027) ￿ 6796(1 ￿ 0:8004)
0:8004 ￿ 0:5027
= 20215
We then get the reliability ratio
e ￿MZ
￿
(1 ￿ ￿MZ) + ￿MZ =
6796
20215
(1 ￿ 0:8004) + 0:8004
= 0:8675
We now turn to robustness checks using di⁄erent a di⁄erent estimator (median regression)
and dependent variable (log wages).
9.2 Measurement error covariance matrix
Assume that all cross-moments between the true variables and the measurement errors are zero.
E.g. assume that E[c￿vn] = 0: In addition, assume that this also holds for higher moments, e.g.
E[c￿v2
c] = 0;E[(c￿)2vc] = 0 and E[c￿n￿vc] = 0 upto a total order of three, e.g. E[xkymzl], for
any variables x;y;z and k +m+l ￿ 3 Also assume that cov((c￿)2;v2
n) = 0 and cov(vc
2;v2
n) = 0.
Though we focus on cognitive ability, the corresponding terms are identical for noncognitive
ability.
9.2.1 Variance in measurement error for quadratic terms
Measurement error in quadratic terms is
32vc2 ￿ c2 ￿ c￿2 = (c￿ + vc)(c￿ + vc) ￿ c￿2
= 2c￿vc + v2
c.





















































9.2.2 Covariance in measurement error between linear and quadratic terms
It follows from above that Cov(vc;vc2) = Cov(vc;2c￿vc + v2
c). Thus,
Cov(vc;vc2) = Cov(vc;2c￿vc + v2
c)
= E[(vc ￿ Evc)(2c￿vc + v2
c ￿ Evc2)]
















c] by assumption of independence with all
higher moments. Also notice that E[c￿] = 0 according to our normalization. Thus:
Cov(vc;vc2) = 0.
9.2.3 Variance in measurement error for interaction term
Measurement error in the interaction term is given by
33vcn = cn ￿ c￿n￿ = c￿n￿ ￿ (c￿ + vc)(n￿ + vn)
= c￿vn + vcn￿ + vcvn.
Further,
V ar(vcn) = E [(vcn ￿ Evcn)(vcn ￿ Evcn)].
Since
Evcn = E [c￿vn + vcn￿ + vcvn] = 0
we obtain











































9.2.4 Covariance in measurement error between linear and interaction terms
Consider the case of the linear term in cognitive ability
Cov (vc;vcn) = E [(vc ￿ Evc)(vcn ￿ Evcn)]
= E [vcvcn]








349.2.5 Covariance in measurement error between quadratic and interaction terms
Cov (vc2;vcn) = E [(vc2 ￿ Evc2)(vcn ￿ Evcn)]
= E [(vc2 ￿ 1)(vcn)]











2c￿vc (c￿vn + vcn￿ + vcvn) + v2

















9.2.6 Reliability ratios of higher order terms
We calculate the reliability ratios assuming that both c and n are normally distributed with
mean zero and unit variance. Let v0 =
h
vc vn vc2 vn2 vcn
i
be the vector of measurement
error terms. The covariance between (observed) c and n, and between c2 and n2, is set equal to
the covariance observed in the data for the subscore measures (:3235 and :2080, respectively).
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0 ￿2






























0:1325 0 0 0 0
0 0:2973 0 0 0
0 0 0:49489 0 0
0 0 0 1:0125 0






To compute the reliability ratios, we also need the variances of the observed variables. For the

























= 3 ￿ 2 + 1
= 2
The variance in the interaction term is given by
V ar(cn) = E [(cn ￿ Ecn)(cn ￿ Ecn)]
Since
Ecn = Cov (c;n) + E [c]E [n]
= Cov (c;n)
we get




2 ￿ 2Cov (c;n)cn + [Cov (c;n)]
i
= E (cn)
2 ￿ 2E [Cov (c;n)cn] + [Cov (c;n)]
2
= E (cn)

















= 1 + Cov
￿
c2;n2￿
= 1 + :2080
= 1:2080
36we get
V ar(cn) = 1:2080 ￿ 0:10465
= 1:1034















Actual variances in the of the higher order terms in the data when we restrict the sample to







10 Appendix D: Alternative cognitive skill measures
Using the sum of subscores for cognitive ability (0-160), we create a dummy variable for each
test score and use these as regressors in the standard regression with the large set of control
variables and noncognitive skill. Figure D1 plots the estimated coe¢ cients for each dummy
variable in the range of ￿2 to +2 standard deviations from the mean. Note that the results are
not adjusted for measurement error, which ￿ attens the estimated curvature (Kuha and Temple
2001).
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42Table 1: Summary statistics                   
                   
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Comment       
Wage in 2006 (W1)  12570  28442  12202  12000  281448         
Imputed wage 1 (W2)  14038  27978  12043  12000  281448         
Imputed wage 2 (W3)  14213  27953  12027  12000  281448  Set to missing in case of zero lagged earnings 
Welfare recipient  14703  0.018  0.133  0  1         
Retirement benefits  14703  0.026  0.159  0  1         
Unemployment support  14703  0.092  0.289  0  1         
Any benefit  14703  0.126  0.332  0  1         
Unemployment duration (if > 0)  1174  0.53  0.363  0,003  1  Set to zero in case of zero lagged earnings 
Total wage income 2006  14703  319792  206140  0  4589613         
Cognitive skill (c)  14703  0.001  1.000  -2.186  1.992  Normalized       
Cognitive skill (c) – alternative measure  13613  -.000  .999  -3.621  3.796  Based on sum of subscores 
Noncognitive skill (n)  14703  0.001  1.000  -2.525  2.357  Normalized       
Noncognitive skill (n) – alternative measure  11960  .000  .985  -2.958  3.102  Based on sum of subscores   
Enlisted in the military  14703  0.900  0.300  0  1         
Enlisted as squad leader  14703  0.204  0.403  0  1         
Enlisted as platoon leader  14703  0.088  0.283  0  1         
Geography: Gothenburg  14703  0.054  0.227  0  1         
Geography: Stockholm  14703  .089  .284  0  1         
Geography: Malmo  14703  .201  .400  0  1         
Geography: "Götaland"  14703  .043  .203  0  1         
Geography: "Svealand"  14703  .478  .500  0  1         
Geography: "Norrland"  14703  .397  .489  0  1         
Experience  12752  14.39  5.96  0  25         
Education: Primary school  14656  0.080  0.272  0  1         
Education: Secondary school  14656  0.556  0.497  0  1         
Education: Two years beyond secondary school  14656  0.094  0.292  0  1         
Education: University  14656  0.256  0.436  0  1         
Education: PhD  14656  0.013  0.115  0  1         
Family background: Household income in 1980  14673  1078  588  0  573700     
Family background: Parents married in 1980  14673  0.791  0.406  0  1     
Family background: Father white-collar worker  10771  0.321  0.467  0  1  Coded from industry     
Family background: Mother white-collar worker  10886  0.680  0.467  0  1  Coded from industry     
  
Table 2A: Log wages (OLS) - Linear           
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Cognitive skills  0.086***  0.050***  0.089***  0.054***  0.155***    0.110***  0.079***     
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)    (0.003)  (0.004)     
  Noncognitive skills  0.067***  0.059***  0.102***  0.091***    0.165***  0.106***    0.107***   
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.005)   
  Constant  10.044***  9.649***  10.133***  10.156***  10.177***  10.175***  10.175***  10.052***  10.202***  10.098*** 
  (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.024) 
  Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large        Large  Large  Large 
  Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675    .8675  .8675     
  Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267    .70267  .70267    .70267   
  Observations  13974  12235  13974  12235  14038  14038  14038  12235  12235  12235 
  R-squared  0.294  0.343  0.323  0.360  0.200  0.180  0.256  0.325  0.347  0.294 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in (1), (2) and (10), standard errors in (3) - (9) computed with 
nonparametric bootstrap. Wage measure: W2. Standard ability measures in all regressions. 
   
Table 2B: Log wages (OLS) - Nonlinear   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Cognitive skills  0.084***  0.050***  0.079***  0.045***  0.080***  0.046***  0.079***  0.045***  0.082***  0.047***  0.085***  0.050***  0.082***  0.047*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Cognitive skills sq.      0.016***  0.008***      0.015***  0.007***  0.023***  0.014***      0.019***  0.011*** 
      (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)      (0.005)  (0.004) 
Noncog. skills  0.104***  0.092***  0.069***  0.060***  0.068***  0.059***  0.069***  0.060***  0.109***  0.100***  0.102***  0.091***  0.111***  0.101*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Noncog. skills sq.      0.003  0.000      0.001  -0.000  -0.005  -0.013**      -0.016  -0.020* 
      (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.011)  (0.012) 
Cogn.*Noncog.          0.013***  0.006*  0.006*  0.003      0.019***  0.005  0.017  0.011 
          (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)      (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Constant  10.120***  10.156***  10.055***  9.706***  10.066***  9.705***  10.056***  9.706***  10.114***  9.818***  10.107***  9.776***  10.131***  9.830*** 
  (0.011)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.014)  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.045) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
  Skill measure  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt. 
  Reliability ratio c  .8675  .8675  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675 
  Reliability ratio c-sq      1.00  1.00      1.00  1.00  .75256  .75256      .75256  .75256 
  Reliability ratio n  .70267  .70267  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267 
  Reliability ratio n-sq      1.00  1.00      1.00  1.00  .49375  .49375      .49375  .49375 
  Reliability ratio cn          1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00      .64616  .64616  .64616  .64616 
Observations  11080  9743  11080  9743  11080  9743  11080  9743  11080  9743  11080  9743  11080  9743 
R-squared  0.314  0.351  0.290  0.335  0.287  0.334  0.290  0.335  0.321  0.354  0.316  0.352  0.322  0.355 




Table 3: Probability of unemployment support (OLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Cognitive skills  -0.015***  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.011**  -0.025***    -0.020***    -0.015***  -0.012***  -0.013***  -0.010** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Cognitive skills sq.                  0.004*  0.002  0.003  0.000 
                  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Noncognitive skills  -0.024***  -0.021***  -0.039***  -0.033***    -0.045***    -0.036***  -0.027***  -0.024***  -0.046***  -0.044*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Noncognitive skills sq.                  0.008***  0.007***  0.021***  0.021*** 
                  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant  0.217***  0.442***  0.116***  0.216***  0.160***  0.116***  0.255***  0.207***  0.173***  0.397***  0.122***  0.323*** 
  (0.016)  (0.039)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.043)  (0.021)  (0.058) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Small  Large  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Skill measure  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt. 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675    .8675    1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio c-sq                  1.00  1.00  .75256  .75256 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267    .70267    .70267  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267 
Reliability ratio n-sq                  1.00  1.00  .49375  .49375 
Observations  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  14626  12726  12726  11553  10104  11553  10104 
R-squared  0.030  0.042  0.033  0.044  0.026  0.032  0.038  0.044  0.033  0.043  0.039  0.048 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in (1) - (2) and (9) - (10) , standard errors in (3) - (8) and (11) – (12) 
computed with nonparametric bootstrap. 






Table 4: Probability of any form of social assistance (OLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Cognitive skills  -0.023***  -0.016***  -0.018***  -0.014***  -0.042***    -0.030***    -0.024***  -0.017***  -0.019***  -0.014*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Cognitive skills sq.                  0.009***  0.007***  0.008***  0.005 
                  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Noncognitive skills  -0.042***  -0.035***  -0.068***  -0.056***    -0.077***    -0.060***  -0.042***  -0.037***  -0.075***  -0.069*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
Noncognitive skills sq.                  0.016***  0.014***  0.043***  0.039*** 
                  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Constant  0.280***  0.630***  0.199***  0.292***  0.275***  0.199***  0.358***  0.280***  0.249***  0.570***  0.156***  0.443*** 
  (0.018)  (0.045)  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.050)  (0.030)  (0.059) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Small  Large  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Skill measure  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt. 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675    .8675    1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio c-sq                  1.00  1.00  .75256  .75256 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267    .70267    .70267  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267 
Reliability ratio n-sq                  1.00  1.00  .49375  .49375 
Observations  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  14626  12726  12726  11553  10104  11553  10104 
R-squared  0.060  0.059  0.068  0.065  0.050  0.066  0.051  0.064  0.063  0.061  0.078  0.073 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in (1) - (2) and (9) - (10), standard errors in (3) - (8) and (11) – (12) 
computed with nonparametric bootstrap. 
                       
  
Table 5: Unemployment duration 
  Exponential  Weibull  OLS  OLS 
Cognitive skill  1.012  0.928  1.012  0.928  -0.003  0.017  0.005  0.030* 
  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Noncognitive skill  1.139***  1.173***  1.137***  1.173***  -0.037***  -0.045***  -0.063***  -0.077*** 
  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.021) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Reliability ratio c  -  -  -  -  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio n  -  -  -  -  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267 
Observations  1173  926  1173  926  1173  926  1173  926 
R-squared  -  -  -  -  0.023  0.040  0.028  0.049 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in OLS without 
adjustment for measurement error. Standard errors in OLS with measurement error adjustment computed with nonparametric 
bootstrap. Standard ability measures in all regressions. 
  
Table 6A: Annual earnings in SEK (OLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Cognitive skills  32,791***  17,931***  31,293***  16,823***  51,407***    31,683***    29,856***  16,371***  29,023***  15,837** 
  (1,751)  (2,173)  (2,107)  (2,702)  (1,913)    (2,948)    (1,968  (2,519)  (2,489)  (3,211) 
Cognitive skills sq.                  4,885**  1,668  7,653**  3,786** 
                  (1,369)  (1,517)  (2,149)  (1,782 
Noncognitive skills  37,148***  33,118***  59,494***  52,490***    74,369***    57,569***  36,230*  31,918**  57,946***  52,139*** 
  (1,947)  (2,098)  (3,170)  (3,485)    (2,603)    (3,328  (1,939)  (1,998)  (3,358)  (3,679) 
Noncognitive skills sq.                  665  660  -3,453  -4,626 
                  (1,591)  (1,751  (4,536)  (3,874) 
Constant  230,848***  35,534*  309,808***  255,835***  243,371***  308,657***  193,890*  270,305**  257,549***  49,272*  290,229**  101,541** 
  (8,550)  (18,910)  (9,279)  (20,529.804)  (7,572)  (10,515)  (19,692)  (20,951)  (9,928)  (21,094)  (13,448)  (24,989) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Small  Large  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Skill measure  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt. 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675    .8675    1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio c-sq                  1.00  1.00  .75256  .75256 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267    .70267    .70267  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267 
Reliability ratio n-sq                  1.00  1.00  .49375  .49375 
Observations  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  14626  12726  12726  11553  10104  11553  10104 
R-squared  0.168  0.189  0.187  0.201  0.151  0.173  0.173  0.198  0.159  0.179  0.177  0.191 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in (1) - (2) and (9) - (10), standard errors in (3) - (8) and (11) – (12) computed with 
nonparametric bootstrap. 
                       
  
Table 6B: Log of annual earnings, sample truncated at 120,000 SEK (OLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Cognitive skills  0.082***  0.050***  0.084***  0.052***  0.122***    0.080***    0.074***  0.044***  0.074***  0.044*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Cognitive skills sq.                  0.013***  0.006**  0.020***  0.012*** 
                  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Noncognitive skills  0.075***  0.068***  0.116***  0.106***    0.154***    0.121***  0.077***  0.070***  0.124***  0.118*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Noncognitive skills sq.                  0.000  -0.001  -0.014*  -0.019** 
                  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Constant  12.554***  12.109***  12.675***  12.614***  12.555***  12.671***  12.500***  12.658***  12.563***  12.195***  12.638***  12.325*** 
  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.019)  (0.038)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.045)  (0.029)  (0.055) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Small  Large  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Skill measure  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Std.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt.  Alt. 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675    .8675    1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio c-sq                  1.00  1.00  .75256  .75256 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267    .70267    .70267  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267 
Reliability ratio n-sq                  1.00  1.00  .49375  .49375 
Observations  13229  11678  13229  11678  13229  13229  11678  11678  10477  9280  10477  9280 
R-squared  0.213  0.249  0.236  0.264  0.197  0.207  0.231  0.256  0.204  0.236  0.228  0.253 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in (1) - (2) and (9) - (10), standard errors in (3) - (8) and (11) – (12) computed with 
nonparametric bootstrap. 
                       
 
  
Table 7: Probability of annual labor market earnings above different percentiles of the annual earnings distribution (OLS)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Percentile  5  10  25  50  75  90  95 
Cognitive skills  0.003  0.000  0.010***  0.002  0.045***  0.031***  0.091***  0.060***  0.103***  0.061***  0.044***  0.024***  0.020***  0.011*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Noncognitive skills  0.039***  0.031***  0.056***  0.047***  0.100***  0.087***  0.138***  0.121***  0.105***  0.092***  0.062***  0.056***  0.037***  0.033*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Constant  0.896***  0.871***  0.847***  0.784***  0.708***  0.620***  0.500***  0.446***  0.259***  0.229***  0.116***  0.062*  0.059***  0.003 
  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.008)  (0.025) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Reliability ratio c  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio n  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267 
Observations  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726 
R-squared  0.046  0.035  0.055  0.043  0.092  0.086  0.157  0.166  0.204  0.235  0.144  0.170  0.092  0.112 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors computed with nonparametric bootstrap in parentheses. Standard ability measures in all regressions. 
                          
Table 8: Changes in conditional percentiles of annual earnings (quantile regression) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Percentile  10  25  50  75  90 
Cognitive skills  19,423***  13,642***  18,863***  12,079***  24,549***  14,494***  33,411***  18,636***  44,168***  21,449*** 
  (3,293)  (3,726)  (1,429)  (1,640)  (992)  (1,187)  (1,495)  (1,512)  (2,663)  (2,535) 
Noncognitive skills  37,974***  33,458***  24,631**  22,381***  25,696***  21,832*  30,903***  26,074***  43,729***  35,804*** 
  (3,526)  (3,522)  (1,490)  (1,513)  (1,018)  (1,089)  (1,498)  (1,388)  (2,669)  (2,372) 
Constant  83,645***  -31,302  194,329***  205,821***  280,943***  279,860***  355,318***  343,820***  445,262***  430,955*** 
  (15,105)  (28,754)  (6,768)  (13,023)  (4,689)  (9,519)  (6,977)  (12,114)  (12,395)  (20,816) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Observations  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients not adjusted for measurement error.     
                 
 
  
Table 9: Occupational choice   





Managers  1,011  .43  .55 
Highskilled workers  5,185  .50  .32 






Table 10: Occupational choice, marginal effects from multinomial logit 
  Managers  Highskilled  Lowskilled 
Cognitive skills  0.027***  0.020***  0.173***  0.116***  -0.200***  -0.137*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Noncognitive skills  0.044***  0.045***  0.087***  0.066***  -0.131***  -0.111*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Observations  12,274  10,831  12,274  10,831  12,274  10,831 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients not adjusted for 
measurement error. Standard ability measures in all regressions. 
  
Table 11: Occupation specific skill prices                   
  Managers  Qualified workers  Unqualified workers 
  (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) Lee  (4) BFG  (5) OLS  (6) OLS  (7) Lee  (8) BFG  (9) OLS  (10) OLS  (11) Lee  (12) BFG 
Cognitive skills  0.041***  0.046**  0.059***  0.068**  0.056***  0.064***  0.080***  0.089***  0.012***  0.010***  0.016  0.026 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
Noncognitive skills  0.051***  0.076***  0.107***  0.095**  0.047***  0.069***  0.061***  0.061***  0.027***  0.041***  0.033***  0.042*** 
  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.031)  (0.048)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Constant  10.261***  10.405***  9.296***  10.014***  9.823***  10.132***  9.303***  9.430***  10.064***  10.062***  9.954***  10.024*** 
  (0.121)  (0.121)  (0.466)  (0.684)  (0.086)  (0.032)  (0.369)  (0.313)  (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.102)  (0.202) 
Covariate set  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large  Large 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  .8675  1.00  1.00  1.00  .8675  1.00  1.00  1.00  .8675  1.00  1.00 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  .70267  1.00  1.00  1.00  .70267  1.00  1.00  1.00  .70267  1.00  1.00 
Observations  943  943  595  595  4865  4865  2994  2994  5023  5023  2686  2686 
R-squared  0.338  0.345      0.269  0.281      0.058  0.066     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors computed with nonparametric bootstrap, except for OLS without measurement error adjustment which has 





Table 11, cont: Selection stage 
No observation on occupation  Cognitive skill  -0.236***  (0.051) 
  Noncognitive skill  -0.290***  (0.046) 
  Region 1980: Gothenburg  0.400*  (0.217) 
  Region 1980: Stockholm  0.203  (0.166) 
  Region 1980: Malmö  0.721***  (0.237) 
  Region 1980: Götaland  0.324  (0.205) 
  Region 1980: Svealand  0.427**  (0.201) 
  Mother white-collar 1980  -0.203**  (0.087) 
  Father white-collar 1980  -0.072  (0.086) 
       
Managers  Cognitive skill  -0.012  (0.062) 
  Noncognitive skill  0.351***  (0.055) 
  Region 1980: Gothenburg  -0.396  (0.281) 
  Region 1980: Stockholm  0.144  (0.187) 
  Region 1980: Malmö  0.174  (0.283) 
  Region 1980: Götaland  0.563***  (0.213) 
  Region 1980: Svealand  0.110  (0.220) 
  Mother white-collar 1980  -0.200*  (0.103) 
  Father white-collar 1980  -0.192*  (0.100) 
       
Unqualified workers  Cognitive skill  -0.467***  (0.208) 
  Noncognitive skill  -0.350***  (0.155) 
  Region 1980: Gothenburg  0.268  (0.236) 
  Region 1980: Stockholm  0.037  (0.182) 
  Region 1980: Malmö  0.144  (0.178) 
  Region 1980: Götaland  0.246  (0.073) 
  Region 1980: Svealand  0.453**  (0.074) 
  Mother white-collar 1980  -0.154**  (0.208) 
  Father white-collar 1980  -0.099  (0.155) 
 
Notes: The excluded category is qualified workers. The results for the large set of control variables have been excluded from the Table due to space considerations. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Table 12: Controlling for type of military service (OLS) 



























Cognitive skills  0.075***  0.044***  0.087***  0.053***  -0.016***  -0.013***  -0.028***  -0.020***  31,142***  17,012***  0.020***  0.008* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (2,751)  (3,159)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Noncognitive skills  0.052***  0.049***  0.097***  0.090***  -0.049***  -0.039***  -0.090***  -0.071***  58,799***  52,691***  0.079***  0.064*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (3,870)  (3,584)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Constant  10.030***  9.640***  10.155***  10.179***  0.104***  0.209***  0.172***  0.275***  309,271***  255,844***  0.874***  0.804*** 
  (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (8,456)  (19,259)  (0.014)  (0.024) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Reliability ratio c  1.00  1.00  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675  .8675 
Reliability ratio n  1.00  1.00  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267  .70267 
Observations  13974  12235  13974  12235  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726  14626  12726 
R-squared  0.301  0.346  0.324  0.361  0.035  0.045  0.073  0.068  0.187  0.201  0.061  0.048 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors computed with nonparametric bootstrap, except for OLS without measurement error adjustment which has heteroskedasticity-robust 




Table B1: Controlling for selection bias in regression of log wages 
  (1) OLS  (2) OLS  (3) OLS  (4) OLS  (5) Median  (6) Median  (7) IAI  (8) IAI  (9) Heckman    (10) Heckman   
Wage measure  W1  W1  W3  W3  W2q  W2q  W2  W2  W2  Select  W2  Select 
Cognitive skills  0.086***  0.051***  0.084***  0.049***  0.083***  0.050***  0.092***  0.052***  0.088***  0.025  0.050***  -0.018 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.003)  (0.026) 
Noncognitive skills  0.065***  0.057***  0.066***  0.059***  0.059***  0.051***  0.071***  0.062***  0.087***  0.206***  0.062***  0.167*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.024) 
Constant  10.094***  9.669***  10.051***  9.744***  9.976***  9.625***  10.085***  9.767***  9.943***  1.659***  10.140***  1.387*** 
  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.086)  (0.042)  (0.237) 
Covariate set  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Small  Small  Small 
Observations  12545  11036  14150  12384  14626  12726  13760  12163  14629  14629  12729  12729 
R-squared  0.298  0.346  0.290  0.339      0.279  0.336         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients not adjusted for measurement error. Standard ability measures in all regressions. 
 
 
 